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CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
United States Constitution Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; ....
New York Constitution Article I Section 6:
[I]n any trial in any any court whatever the party
accused shall be allowed to... be confronted with the
witnesses against him....




(decided July 3, 2002)
Defendant Corey Young was convicted of multiple crimes
ranging from attempted murder in the first degree and attempted
aggravated assault upon a police officer to robbery in the second
degree.2 After conviction, Young was sentenced to a term between
fifty-seven years and life in prison.3 The defendant appealed and
argued that the admission of two hearsay statements made by his
robbery accomplice, Michael Cancer, violated his right to
confrontation afforded by both the Federal4 and New York State
Constitutions. 5  The Appellate Division, Third Department,
296 A.D.2d 588, 746 N.Y.S.2d 195 (3d Dep't 2002).
2 Id. at 589, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
3 Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the
witnesses against him."
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to... be confronted with the
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affirmed in part, modified in part,6 and held that the statements
were properly introduced at trial.7
In February 1995, two Albany police officers were alerted
to a robbery in progress.8 Upon arrival at the scene, the officers
encountered a fleeing suspect who shot at the two officers and then
escaped. 9 The robbery and related crimes were investigated for
two years, and ultimately led police investigators to North Carolina
where the defendant was apprehended and arrested.' 0
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred
for several reasons. The first alleged error was that the
government was required to obtain a superseding indictment upon
learning that DNA testing of organic material found at the scene of
the crime belonged to a person other than the defendant." The
defendant relied on People v. Pelchat,12 which held that when
evidence presented before a grand jury is legally insufficient, and
the prosecutor knows such information is deficient; the prosecutor
then has a duty to seek a superseding indictment on the proper
evidence. 13  The appellate division rejected this claim and
6 Young, 296 A.D.2d at 589, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 197, (modifying the defendant's
sentence to run concurrently rather than consecutively based on a comparison to
other heinous crimes).
7 Id. at 592, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
8 Id. at 589, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
9 Id.
10 Id.
I' Young, 296 A.D.2d at 589, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
12 62 N.Y.2d 97, 464 N.E.2d 447, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1984).
"3 id. at 107, 464 N.E.2d at 452, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 82. In Pelchat, the defendant
pleaded guilty to criminal possession of marijuana in the first degree. Id. at 99,
464 N.E.2d at 448, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 80. Pelchat's arrest occurred on September
3, 1981 when police officers observed the "Miss Marge" sail into Gardiner's
Bay and drop anchor off shore near an East Hampton residence. Id. at 100, 464
N.E.2d at 448, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 80. With the aid of night vision goggles, police
observed 72 bales of marijuana being offloaded and transported via Zodiac to
the East Hampton address. Id. At approximately 6:00 a.m., police raided the
house and arrested 21 people, including the defendant. Id. At the Grand Jury
hearing of the defendant, police officer Tuthill testified that the defendant was
one of the people observed unloading the marijuana. Id. at 101, 464 N.E.2d at
449, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 81. In fact, however, Officer Tuthill believed [emphasis
added] to be testifying as to an enumerated individual arrested at the scene. Id.
Pelchat was subsequently indicted and pleaded guilty to the crime of criminal
possession of marijuana in the first degree. Id. Before being sentenced,
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distinguished this case from Pelchat on the basis that Young was
convicted at trial whereas Pelchat had pleaded guiity.
14
Young also argued that the convictions of both attempted
murder and reckless endangerment were inconsistent. 5  The
appellate division, however, found the issue inappropriate for
review based on the defendant's failure to preserve the issue before
the jury was discharged.16
Young next alleged that by admitting two hearsay
statements into evidence, his constitutional rights under the
Confrontation Clause of both the United States Constitution and
the New York Constitution were violated.' 7 Young's allegation
rested on the fact that the statements admitted against him did not
afford him the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant as
required under the Confrontation Clause.
In Ohio v. Roberts,18 the United States Supreme Court
articulated a two-part test that operates to restrict the admissibility
however, Tuthill appeared as a witness at the trial of the other defendants, where
it was learned of Tuthill's error before the grand jury. Id.
14 Young, 296 A.D.2d at 589, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
151d.16 id.
17 Id. at 590, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 198; see supra notes 4 -5.
'" 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In Roberts, police officers arrested the defendant for
forgery and possession of stolen credit cards. Id. at 58. At a subsequent hearing,
the victim's daughter testified that although she knew the defendant, she did not
give him the checks and credit cards. Id. Although, defendant's attorney could
have declared her hostile and subjected her to cross-examination, he did not
pursue those measures. Id. At trial, defendant testified that the victim's
daughter gave him the credit cards and checks; and despite five separate
subpoenas, the daughter did not report to the courtroom. Id. at 59. Relying on
an Ohio statute, which permits the use of prior testimony of a witness that
cannot be produced at trial, the government introduced a transcript of the prior
testimony. Id. Thereafter, the defendant was convicted and appealed his
conviction based on a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id. The appellate
court reversed based on a lack of a good-faith showing that the government
attempted to secure the witness other than with the subpoenas. Id. at 59-60. The
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds; that the evidence was
inadmissible based on the fact that defendant's attorney, although he had the
opportunity to cross-examine, did not satisfy the constitutional protection of the
Confrontation Clause. Id. at 60. The Supreme Court granted review and
determined that introduction of the prior testimony was constitutionally
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of hearsay evidence.19 The first part of the test is whether the
prosecution can produce or otherwise prove the unavailability of
the declarant whose statements the government wishes to use at
trial in furtherance of its case.2° Once the government satisfies the
first part of the test, the court then scrutinizes the statement to
determine the trustworthiness of the declaration.
21
When analyzing the first factor, the Court stated that either
the witness must be produced at trial, or sufficient evidence must
be presented to the court to explain why the witness was unable to
be called to testify.22 The reasoning behind this requirement is
somewhat ideological in that the jury has a right to "look at him,
and judge by his demeanor on the stand and the manner in which
he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief., 23 However,
if the witness is unavailable, the court, contrary to the strict
language of the Confrontation Clause, will allow the testimony so
long as the testimony has such indicia of reliability as to rest the
testimony upon such solid foundation that the evidence comports
with the "substance of the constitutional protection." 24
Notable, however, is the rule that comes from United States
v. Owens,25 which states that "the confrontation clause guarantees
only 'an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
extent, the defense might wish,",, 26  In Owens, a correctional
counselor at a federal prison was viciously attacked by a prisoner
and suffered a fractured skull.27 At the subsequent trial, the
correctional counselor testified that his only recollection of the
assailant came during an F.B.I. interview that occurred after the
reliability based on the rigorous examination of the witness by respondent's
attorney during the original hearing. Id. at 62.




23 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64.
24 Id. at 66.
25 Id. at 66.
26 Id. at 559 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987); Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985)).
27 Owens, 484 U.S. at 556.
240 [Vol 19
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attack. 28  The defense made the argument that because the
counselor was unable to recall information regarding the assault
during the trial, he was unavailable for cross-examination and
therefore his testimony constituted a violation of the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 29  The Court flatly
rejected defense counsel's argument and stated that counsel may
be able to use summation as a device to overcome the witness's
loss of memory.
30
Next, to determine what facts or situations satisfy the
"indicia of reliability" requirement, the Court states two
circumstances, either of which, if met, will satisfy this element.
The first factor is whether the evidence falls within one of the
firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. 3  The Supreme Court has
decided that among others, excited utterances, 32 and statements
made by co-conspirators, 33 fall within the category of firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions. Although the United States Supreme Court
has identified the general rule, the Court left the decision to the
states to decide what constitutes a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. 34 The second factor is whether there is a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
35
In Idaho v. Wright, the Supreme Court expanded the test
for trustworthiness to include an analysis of the totality of the
circumstance in which the statement was made and if the declarant
28 id.
21 ld. at 557.30 id. at 560.
31 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
32 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992).
33 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 184 (1987).
34 See United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding
absence of public record or entry under FED. R. EvID. 803 (10) within the
exception); United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding
adoptive admission under FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(2)(D) within the exception);
United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d. 1514, 1525-26 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding adoptive
admission under FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(2)(D) within the exception); United
States v. Ray, 930 F.2d. 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding records of regularly
conducted activity FED. R. EvID. 803 (6) within the exception).
35 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (holding that prior statements made by the witness
bore sufficient indicia of reliability because the statements were made in a quasi-
trial-like environment, witness was under oath, the defendant was represented by
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was worthy of belief.36 In Wright, the statements were made by a
two-year-old, who alleged that her mother held her down and
covered her mouth while a man had sexual intercourse with her.
37
The statements were made to a doctor during a subsequent
examination of the child, after her father learned of the sexual
abuse.38 The trial court concluded that the child was too young to
testify, and accordingly, the doctor was permitted to testify as to
the content of*the conversations with the young victim. 39 The trial
court admitted the statements under the Idaho residual hearsay
40
exception. Wright appealed, and the Idaho Supreme Court
reversed her conviction because the admission of the statement
under the residual hearsay rule violated her constitutional right to
confrontation. 4 1 The United States Supreme Court later affirmed
the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court.42 The Court found that
Idaho's residual hearsay exception does not qualify as a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception,43 and therefore the admittance of the
statement rested on a showing that the statement satisfied the
36 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990).
17 Id. at 809.
38 id.
39 Id. (holding the content of the conversations implicated both respondent and
Giles in the criminal acts committed against the declarant and her five-year-old
sister).
40 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 811 (citing Idaho R. Evid. 803 (24) stating in
pertinent part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness. (24) Other
exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A)
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.).
41 Wright, 497 U.S. at 812.42 Id. at 813.
43 Id. at 817 (reasoning that the residual hearsay exception fails to qualify as a
"firmly rooted" exception because the statements made under this exception do
not fall under any of the other recognized exceptions and the statement therefore
does not share the same reliability as the other exceptions.)
[Vol 19
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"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" factor.4  The
Supreme Court reasoned that outside of cross-examination, a
statement may be sufficiently free from inaccuracy and
untrustworthiness by an examination of the circumstances
surrounding the statement.45  However, excluded from the
examination is evidence that would, if admissible, both corroborate
the truth of the statement and support the particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness. 46 This "bootstrapping" of evidence, if allowed,
would defeat the requirement that the evidence carries sufficient
indicia of reliability to satisfy the Confrontation Clause; and
therefore only those factors that surround the making of the
statement are to be analyzed.47
Accordingly, the Supreme Court only considered the
questions: whether the child had sufficient motive to fabricate the
story, and whether a child of like age could make-up such a story.48
The Court noted the two and one-half-year-old volunteered the
statement, and spontaneity may suggest that the statement was
truthful. However, spontaneity is not dispositive of truth telling
based on the presence of outside factors, such as prompting or
other adult influence.49 Based on the "presumptive unreliability"
of the statements and the fact that leading questions were utilized,
the statements lacked the "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" required for admission.
50
The New York courts have utilized the same two-part test
articulated by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts,5 1 and
subsequently expanded in Idaho v. Wright.52 In People v. James,53
the defendant was found guilty of perjury based on the admission
of two statements that bore sufficient indicia of reliability under
the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness analysis.5 4 The
" ld. at 818.
41 Id. at 819-20.
46 Wright, 497 U.S. at 822.
41 Id. at 823.
4 Id. at 826.
49 Id. at 826-27.
so Id.
5' 448 U.S. at 56.
52 497 U.S. at 805.
13 93 N.Y.2d 620, 717 N.E.2d 1052, 695 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1999).
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court based its decision on the fact that the statements were made
outside a custodial setting, amongst friends, unsolicited,
spontaneous, self-inculpatory, and did not attempt to shift blame to
persons other than the declarant.5 Additionally, the court may
consider repetition, absence of motive to fabricate, the mental state
of the defendant, the unlikelihood of faulty recollection, and to
whom the statements were made. 6
Similarly, in People v. Sanders,57 the New York Court of
Appeals discussed Confrontation Clause analysis as applied to a
statement admitted under the co-conspirator exception to hearsay.58
Sanders was indicted and subsequently found guilty of conspiracy
to commit bribery and bribery in the second degree following a
series of transactions involving corruption in the New York
County Supreme Court. 59 The most damaging evidence used by
the District Attorney against Sanders was tape-recorded
conversations between Brown and Sander's co-counsel. 60  The
Sanders court began its analysis by stating the two-part test from
Ohio v. Roberts as follows: first, the hearsay declarant must be
unavailable, and second, that statement must bear sufficient indicia
of reliability.61 In this case, Brown, the declarant, died several
weeks after his arrest and therefore the first requirement of
unavailability was met.62 The court then looked at the facts
surrounding the statement to decide if the indicators of reliability
were present. 63 The court answered in the affirmative and stated
that because Brown's statements were recorded on tape, made with
actual knowledge, without motive to fabricate, independently
corroborated, and directly connected Brown to criminal activity,
55 Id.
56 id.
5 56 N.Y.2d 51, 436 N.E.2d 480, 451 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1982).
58 Id. at 56, 436 N.E.2d at 481,451 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
'9 Id. at 61, 436 N.E.2d at 484,451 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
60 Id. Abram Brown worked as a "chief opinion clerk" in Special Term, New
York County and was the contact of Sanders for fixing the outcomes of cases
within the jurisdiction of that court. Id. at 57.
61 id.
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the statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability and did not
violate Sander's constitutional right of confrontation.
64
In the instant case, People v. Young,65 the Third
Department found certain statements admissible against the
defendant.66 The statements were made by the defendant's robbery
accomplice and implicated Young's involvement in the original
robbery.67 Specifically, the accomplice, Michael Cancer, stated to
a third party that he and Young were "going to get somebody," and
"we robbed some guys of the[ir] coats. '68 The court, utilizing the
two-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright,
found that the declarant was unable to testify69 and that the
statements were supported by a particularized guarantee of
trustworthiness. 70  The court reasoned that the self-inculpatory
nature of the statements made by Cancer, together with the
environment in which the statements were made, and the absence
of any blame-shifting, satisfied the constitutional requirement of
indicia of reliability. 7
In sum, the Federal and New York Constitutions provide
that in a criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the right, or
be allowed to be confronted with the witnesses against him. ' The
Federal and New York Constitutions provide for substantially
similar rights with respect to the ability of a criminal defendant to
confront the witnesses against him. To recapitulate, hearsay
statements used by the prosecution against the accused are
inadmissible as a violation of the accused's constitutional right to
confrontation unless the declarant is unavailable, and the statement
bears sufficient indicia of reliability; it falls within a firmly rooted
64 Id. at 64, 436 N.E.2d at 487, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
65 Young, 296 A.D.2d at 589, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
66 Id. at 591, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
67 Id. at 590, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
68 id.
69 Id. at 588, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 198. The court states without any supporting
evidence that Michael Cancer's "unavailability is undisputed."
70 Young, 296 A.D.2d at 588, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
71 Id. at 591, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 198-99.
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" Young, 296 A.D.2d at 590, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (quoting James, 93 N.Y.2d
at 641, 717 N.E.2d at 1064, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 727; Wright, 497 U.S. at 816;
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
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